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Introduction
Since the inception of floating exchange rates
nearly 20 years ago, governments have refused
to give private markets free reign in determining
the exchange values of their currencies. They
have instead bought and sold foreign exchange
in an attempt to influence the path of exchange
rates or to reduce the volatility of exchange
rates around that path. Nearly all governments
contend that intervention is effective. Less cer-
tain—and fundamental in the continuing debate
about intervention—is whether central banks
can separate intervention from their overall
monetary policies and have it remain an effec-
tive tool for influencing exchange rates.
If nations could successfully intervene with-
out altering their monetary bases (sterilized in-
tervention), then any country could manipulate
its exchange rate without jeopardizing price sta-
bility, and any group of countries could coordi-
nate its exchange-rate goals without sacrificing
monetary sovereignty. If, instead, intervention is
effective only when it induces a change in the
monetary base or, possibly, when it signals
future changes in monetary policies, then one
must weigh the merits of attempting to influence
exchange rates against the potential conflicts
with domestic monetary policy objectives.
This paper surveys theoretical arguments and
recent empirical literature bearing on this contro-
versy. Two conclusions emerge: First, the recent
literature offers some threads of evidence to sup-
port the view that intervention can sometimes in-
fluence market expectations and exchange rates.
Nevertheless, these threads cannot be woven
into a strong fabric of support for an active inter-
vention policy, whereby central banks acquire
huge portfolios, enter markets frequently, and
undertake large, sterilized transactions. I find lit-
tle evidence to support interventions of the type
that the Group of Three Countries (G3)—West
Germany, Japan, and the United States —
undertook in late 1985, mid-1987, and 1989- In-
stead, the evidence suggests that under rather
specific and unusual circumstances, sterilized in-
tervention might temporarily influence exchange
rates. Second, I find that exchange-rate interven-
tion and price stability are not always incompat-
ible, but they can be difficult to combine.B 0 X 1
Sterilized and Nonsterilized
Intervention






Net position in IMF
Monetary Base




Loans to depository institutions
Other
Net Worth
The table above, which presents a stylized balance sheet for
a hypothetical central bank, helps to illustrate the important
distinction between sterilized and nonsterilized intervention.
On the asset side of the ledger are net foreign assets (NFA ),
which consist of foreign reserves less liabilities to foreign offi-
cials, and domestic assets (DA), which consist primarily of
loans to depository institutions and government securities.
On the liability side of the ledger is the monetary base (MB).
Assume that net worth is zero. Then both sides of the ledger
will balance such that
NFA + DA = MB.
When a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange
market, it buys or sells foreign assets (NFA ) in exchange for
its domestic currency. The transaction increases the nation's
monetary base, in keeping with the balance-sheet identity:
A MB = A NFA.
The change in the monetary base leads to a multiple ex-
pansion of the nation's money stock. This intervention is
nonsterilized. Notice that it is similar to a domestic open-
market transaction, except that it is undertaken with foreign
exchange rather than with government securities.
The monetary authority can offset the impact of this inter-
vention on the monetary base, or sterilize it, by undertaking
offsetting transactions with other assets. Typically, central
banks do this by selling government securities or by altering
their lending to depository institutions until
&MB = -ADA.
If nations undertake intervention in close consultation, all
governments could sterilize intervention in a similar manner.
The process of intervening, especially if that intervention
is completely sterilized, will change the mix of foreign and
domestic assets held by central banks. Correspondingly,
sterilized central-bank intervention must change the mix of
domestic and foreign governmental assets held by the public.
I. Monetary Policy
and Intervention
From an academic perspective, the distinction
between sterilized and nonsterilized intervention,
upon which this controversy ultimately focuses,
is straightforward, if not trivial. A central bank
can easily stabilize its monetary base, despite any
exchange-market activity, by undertaking coun-
tervailing transactions through open-market
operations or through other conventional mone-
tary policy instruments. Nonsterilized interven-
tion involves no monetary offset and differs from
a typical monetary policy transaction only in that
a central bank alters its monetary base through a
change in its foreign asset holdings rather than
through a change in its domestic asset holdings
(see box 1).
Despite its academic clarity, the practical dis-
tinction between sterilized and nonsterilized in-
tervention is neither obvious nor simple. Most
countries, including the United States, claim to
sterilize their intervention, but do so in the sense
of not allowing their foreign exchange transac-
tions to interfere with monetary policy goals,
which may include an exchange-rate objective.
When these countries factor exchange-rate tar-
gets into their monetary policy objectives, they
need not offset their intervention activities cur-
rency unit per currency unit to conform with this
definition of sterilized intervention. Although
U.S. officials and many others accept this defini-
tion of sterilized intervention, it seems to violate
the spirit of the term, because it no longer offers
a means of pursuing independent exchange-rate
and domestic monetary policy objectives.
Throughout this paper, I define intervention as
central-bank actions to influence exchange rates,
and I define monetary policy only in terms of
domestic price stability.
None of the G3 countries completely divorces
its intervention activities from its domestic mon-
etary policies; these countries either occasionally
adopt exchange-rate targets for their monetary
policies, or they do not always completely steril-
ize their intervention. Pauls (1990, p. 901), for
example, observes, "During times when the dol-
lar's exchange value raised particular concern —
1977-79, 1984-85, and 1987 —it became a sig-
nificant factor in Federal Reserve decisions
regarding monetary policy." Furlong (1989) also
shows that FOMC directives from 1986 through
1988 gave substantial weight to exchange rates.
Although the United States routinely sterilizes its
intervention, in accordance with the definition
mentioned in the previous paragraph, it doesnot completely separate its exchange-rate and
monetary policies.
In a recent article, Neumann and von Hagen
(1991) show that the German Bundesbank has
often permitted deviations between actual
money growth and targeted money growth
because of exchange-rate considerations. Fol-
lowing von Hagen (1989), they also argue that
when the mark is strong against both the dollar
and the Exchange-Rate-Mechanism currencies,
the Bundesbank does not permanently sterilize
its intervention.
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The situation is similar for Japan. Hutchison
(1988) indicates that the Bank of Japan factored
an exchange-rate objective into its monetary
policy decisions between 1978 and 1985, and
Takagi (1989) shows that since late 1985, the




Economic theory suggests three linkages be-
tween intervention and exchange rates, which
differ in their implications for sterilized interven-
tion. Only one of these, the portfolio-adjustment
channel, allows completely sterilized interven-
tion to affect exchange rates permanently.
Through a second mechanism, the signaling
channel, intervention can influence market ex-
pectations and, thereby, exchange rates. The lit-
erature presents two versions of signaling.
According to the first, intervention might supple-
ment monetary policy by strengthening a central
bank's credibility with respect to its stated mone-
tary policy objectives. According to the second
version, if exchange markets are not information-
ally efficient, intervention that improves the flow
of information might influence exchange rates.
Central banks could sterilize such intervention,
but the effect would be temporary. A third chan-
nel, the monetary channel, views intervention as
a type of open-market operation that, by defini-
tion, does not admit even temporary sterilization.
Portfolio Adjustment
By sterilizing intervention through open-market
transactions, central banks change the relative
supplies of publicly held government debt. A
sterilized intervention to depreciate the dollar,
for example, increases the amount of publicly
held U.S. Treasury securities. Under certain cir-
cumstances, such changes in asset stocks affect
exchange rates.
According to the asset-market approach to
exchange-rate determination, risk-averse inves-
tors diversify their portfolios across assets
denominated in different currencies.
2 At equi-
librium, the expected nominal returns on
domestic and foreign assets are equal. Equation
(1) represents this in logarithmic form:
(1)
where rt and r * are one-period domestic and
foreign interest rates, respectively; ft is the cur-
rent forward exchange rate for delivery one
period ahead; and 5, is the current spot ex-
change rate (foreign currency units per domes-
tic currency units).
If investors form their expectations rationally
and view domestic and foreign assets as perfect
substitutes, the forward exchange rate will equal
the expected future exchange rate. If, however,
investors believe that domestic and foreign
assets have different risk characteristics, then the
forward exchange rate will differ from the future
expected exchange rate by a risk premium. Let
(2) ft - 0,
which defines the domestic asset as the relatively
risky asset. Under the assumption that domestic
and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, the
equilibrium condition becomes
(3)
As equation (3) indicates, investors compare
the return on a domestic asset with the return on
a foreign asset, which includes the interest earn-
ings, the expected change in the exchange rate
over the holding period, and a risk premium, 0.
Rearranging equation (3), one can express the
risk premium in terms of the interest-rate differ-
ential and the expected change in the exchange
rate:
(4)
Although economists lack a widely accepted
theoretical model of the risk premium, most
express it, among other things, as a positive
• 1 See also Kahn and Jacobson (1989) and, for a somewhat dif-
ferent opinion, Obstfeld (1983).
• 2 Edison (1990), Humpage (1986), Obstfeld (1988), and Weber
(1986) discuss this channel.function of relative asset supplies.
3 When the
relative supply of a country's assets increases, we
expect that the risk premium on those assets also
increases. Either a widening interest-rate differ-
ential, or a widening spread between the ex-
pected future exchange rate and the current spot
exchange rate, or both, can accommodate a rise
in the risk premium, as equation (4) indicates.
The exact mix of interest-rate and exchange-
rate adjustments associated with a change in the
risk premium would seem important for evalu-
ating sterilized intervention. That both interest
rates and the expected exchange rate could
change is entirely plausible (Obstfeld [1988]).
Many studies, however, assume that because
sterilized intervention leaves the monetary base
unchanged, it also does not affect interest rates
(Edison [1990]). Still others assume that the mar-
ket determines the expected future exchange
rate exogenously, so that sterilized intervention
affects only the spot exchange rate. Although
these are testable assumptions, no studies ex-
plicitly address them. A policy to depreciate the
dollar could conceivably put upward pressure
on domestic interest rates.
4
Economists have not investigated the influ-
ence of intervention on the underlying compo-
nents of the risk premium, because generally
they have found little evidence that intervention
operates through this channel. Researchers typi-
cally conclude that risk premiums exist and that
they vary through time, but they have not suc-
ceeded in relating these changes to relative asset
supplies. With near unanimity, researchers
have found the relationship to be either statisti-
cally insignificant or quantitatively unimportant.
Three notable exceptions are Kearney and Mac-
Donald (1986), who study intervention in Great
Britain and attribute their findings in part to capi-
tal controls during the estimation period, Domin-
guez and Frankel (1989), and Dominguez
(1990a). The last two studies, which look at the
heavy intervention by West Germany, Japan, and
the United States during the 1980s, are particu-
larly interesting. Using a two-equation, simulta-
neous system (discussed later), Dominguez and
Frankel find statistical evidence of portfolio
effects, which could have practical relevance un-
der some conditions. Studying a similar period,
• 3 See Hodrick (1987) for a comprehensive survey of the I iterature
and Osterberg (1989) lor a theoretical model that explicitly includes
intervention.
• 4 The results of Dominguez (1990b) raise interesting questions
with respect to this issue (see appendix).
however, Humpage and Osterberg (1990) find
mixed evidence of portfolio effects, but none of
the coefficients seem large (see appendix).
In attempting to explain the empirical evi-
dence, many economists observe that interven-
tion volumes are too small relative to the
outstanding stock of publicly held assets to have
a perceptible impact on portfolio decisions and
exchange rates. The total stock of publicly held
U.S. government securities, for example, was
nearly $2.3 trillion at the end of 1989. U.S. inter-
vention amounted to $22 billion that year, a
record volume, but it was less than 1 percent of
the total stock of publicly held U.S. securities.
Even if dollar interventions of the other 10 major
industrial countries are included, the total
amount represents only about 3 percent of the
total stock of publicly held debt.
6
Empirical research on risk premiums is sub-
ject to another qualification that is important for
understanding intervention. Studies of risk pre-
miums assume that exchange markets are ration-
al in the sense of using all available information
and of not making systematic forecast errors.
Under this assumption, the market's failure to
exploit all profitable interest-arbitrage oppor-
tunities must reflect a risk premium, not market
inefficiencies. Recent work on expectations, dis-
cussed below, casts doubt on the validity of this
assumption. If exchange markets are not per-
fectly efficient, what empirical studies interpret
as a time-varying risk premium could instead
reflect market inefficiencies. This would open
another door through which intervention might
affect exchange rates.
Signaling
Without a portfolio-adjustment effect, sterilized
intervention will not affect exchange rates per-
manently. Nevertheless, central banks might
maintain some temporary leverage in the market
if they could improve the flow of information to
the market and influence market expectations.
Some economists have suggested that sterilized
intervention functions as such.
When making exchange-rate quotations, per-
fectly efficient traders incorporate all available
information, including their best guess about
future policy developments. Reflecting this proc-
ess, economists typically specify the exchange
rate as a function both of contemporaneous fun-
damentals and of the expected future change in
the exchange rate:
• 5 Edison (1990) presents an excellent annotated bibliography that
covers portfolio-adjustment models. 6 See Ghosh (1989), Hutchison (1984), and Loopesko (1984).(5)
where s, is the current spot exchange rate; zt
represents a linear combination of fundamentals;
[E(st + , - 5,1 Q,) ] is the expected change in the
exchange rate conditional on all information
currently available, £lt; and p is the elasticity of
the current exchange rate with respect to expec-
tations. Solving equation (5) by successively sub-
stituting in future values of the spot exchange
rate, one obtains
(6)
which shows the spot exchange rate as the dis-
counted sum of expected future values of the
fundamentals.
Defining the relevant set of fundamentals is
not an issue here. In general, economists employ
factors that influence the supply and demand of
domestic and foreign money.
7 For the purposes
of this paper, equation (6) is important because
it highlights the role of new information and
expectations in determining exchange rates, and
illustrates that intervention can affect current
spot exchange rates if it provides information
about fundamentals. Two such scenarios seem
plausible: Through intervention, a central bank
could reveal priority information about unantici-
pated changes in monetary policy to an other-
wise perfectly efficient market.
8 Or, ignoring
the possibility of priority information, a central
bank might enhance the informational efficiency
of the private sector through intervention, if it
enjoyed unique economies in the acquisition
and processing of publicly available informa-
tion. I consider both of these cases below.
cast doubt on its universal applicability. Domin-
guez (1988), for example, reports evidence that
following the October 1979 change in Federal
Reserve operating procedures, the System sig-
naled its intention to offset unanticipated money
changes through intervention and that this inter-
vention subsequently influenced exchange
rates. Over two adjacent time periods, she found
no evidence for signaling. Studying a more
recent period, Klein and Rosengren (1991) con-
clude that neither the Federal Reserve nor the
Bundesbank used intervention as a signal of
policy changes. They did find, however, that
coordinated intervention significantly affected
daily exchange rates between the Group of Five
Countries' (G5) Plaza meeting in September
1985 and the Group of Seven Countries' (G7)
Tokyo meeting in May 1986, but at no later
period.
9 Unilateral U.S. intervention also af-
fected the exchange rate between the Tokyo
meeting and the Louvre meeting in February
1987. The authors conclude that markets initial-
ly read intervention as a signal, but eventually
learned that it was not intended as such.
If intervention is to affect exchange rates in a
signaling context, it must provide new informa-
tion about credible changes in future monetary
policies. These studies suggest that intervention,
at best, has fulfilled this task only once since the
late 1970s. Perhaps we should expect this. Policy
changes are not exogenous. Officials react to the
state of the economy and to exchange markets
in broadly discernible fashions, and private mar-
kets offer rewards to those who learn to predict
those reactions accurately. When the market
learns how central banks react, the scope for sig-
naling diminishes. This limits the extent to which
central banks can signal with intervention.
New Information
According to many economists, if sterilized inter-
vention purchases (sales) of dollars create the
expectation that the Federal Reserve System will
tighten (ease) monetary policy, the dollar will
appreciate (depreciate) as a result. Two recent
studies focus directly on this mechanism and
• 7 For a recent discussion, see Meese (1990).
• 8 In most countries, the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance ulti-
mately controls exchange-market intervention. Conceivably, intervention
could then signal changes in fiscal policies. Given both the relative inflexi-
bility of fiscal policy and the uncertainty about the effects of fiscal policy on




The signaling aspect of intervention is provoca-
tive not only for the possible channel of influ-
ence it portends, but also because of a question
it raises: What possible signaling advantage does
intervention have over a simple announcement
of future policy intentions? Often, as already indi-
cated, studies of intervention find a significant
relationship after the Plaza meeting of the G5.
1
0
• 9 The Group of Five Countries (G5) are France, West Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Group of Seven
Countries (G7) are the G5 plus Canada and Italy.
• 10 See also Marston (1988) for a discussion of signal ing and a
comparison of intervention after the Plaza period with intervention during
the 1978 Carter dollar-defense period.The dollar, however, began to fall against the
mark and yen prior to the meeting, in anticipa-
tion of possible policy changes. Immediately
after the meeting, the dollar fell precipitously,
even before the major central banks began inter-
vening. Through the subsequent days and weeks,
as I indicate in a previous paper (Humpage
[1988]), the dollar's day-to-day movements were
not correlated with day-to-day intervention. In-
stead, the dollar responded to expectations gen-
erated by policy announcements and not to
official currency transactions. When policymak-
ers no longer reinforced or validated expecta-
tions of policy changes to promote a dollar
depreciation, the dollar's decline slowed.
In attempting to explain the signaling mecha-
nism, many economists have argued that the im-
portance of intervention centers not on its ability
to herald policy changes, but on its ability to ce-
ment governments' commitment to those policy
changes.
:
: Even when governments announce
an optimal policy today, they can face incentives
to renege on that policy tomorrow. Markets, of
course, realize this and factor into their expecta-
tions the likelihood that policymakers will not fol-
low through on their pronouncements. Policies
allowing no opportunity for backing down, conse-
quently, can have very different effects than simi-
lar policies that permit reneging.
To understand the role that intervention might
play in cementing credibility, consider an exam-
ple in which the Federal Reserve System tightens
monetary policy to eliminate inflation and to pre-
vent a continuing dollar depreciation. Markets
recognize that political pressure will weigh on
the System if, even temporarily, real interest rates
rise and unemployment results. This possibility
will temper market expectations. Intervention,
however, increases the costs of reneging on an
announced monetary policy change. Through
intervention, the System acquires a short posi-
tion in foreign currencies and a long position in
dollars. Should it not subsequently tighten mon-
etary policy sufficiently to appreciate the dollar,
the dollar value of its foreign-currency debts will
rise relative to its dollar assets. The United States
will experience losses on its foreign-currency
portfolio, which could have budgetary implica-
tions and could prove politically embarrassing.
1
2
The importance of intervention profits in in-
fluencing central-bank monetary policy seems
• 11 Dominguez distinguishes between signaling, as discussed
above, and targeting, the sending of false signals. Because intervention
leaves the monetary base unaffected, it allows central banks the opportu-
nity to renege on policy. Central banks could not renege in this way very
often without destroying their credibility, but in certain circumstances,
sending false signals could prove effective. See Dominguez (1990b).
related to their size. Table 1 lists the reported
Federal Reserve System profits from its foreign-
exchange operations since 1975
1
3 This table in-
cludes both realized profits, which reflect actual
currency transactions, and unrealized profits,
which result from currency swings that alter the
value of foreign-exchange inventories.
Judging from the pattern and size of past prof-
its, intervention probably has not significantly
influenced the costs of reneging on Federal
Reserve policy. Although on balance the System
has shown a profit, it reported losses for 10 of the
15 years listed in the table without obvious politi-
cal fallout. The reason is that balances associated
with intervention have typically been small rela-
tive to profits remitted to the Treasury (usually
less than 10 percent) and are only a trivial com-
ponent of overall federal budget receipts (typi-
cally less than 2.5 percent).
In recent years, however, the System's portfo-
lio of foreign currencies has increased sharply.
To accommodate the rise, the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee increased the System's authoriza-
tion for holding a net open position in foreign
exchange to $25 billion in early 1990 from $12
billion in early 1989- This steep rise in holdings
of foreign currency has greatly increased the
chances of substantial unrealized losses should
the dollar appreciate sharply.
1
4 The swings in
profits could reach levels at which their practical
significance might become important. As
Obstfeld (1988, p. 43) notes, when the federal
budget deficit is large, even marginal contribu-
tions become significant. The extent to which
such considerations might influence monetary




Intervention might not provide a credible signal
of future monetary policy in a particular country,
but it could indicate to the market and to the
participating governments the willingness of
I 12 As stated in Henderson (1984, p. 391),"... losses on foreign
exchange positions can lead to significant political problems for the
authorities. Thus, if the authorities undertake an intervention policy which
would generate foreign exchange losses if their pronouncements about
future monetary policy were not put into effect, there might be more
reason for private agents to take these pronouncements seriously."
• 13 Table 1 contains published data. Leahy (1989) attempts to cap-
ture the opportunity costs of intervention profits more closely.
• 14 Leahy (1989) suggests how large portfolios make profits sensi-
tive to exchange-rate changes.TABLE 1
Federal Reserve Profits from Foreign
Exchange Operations and Their













































































































a. Profits, payments, and receipts are expressed in millions of dollars.
b. Includes realized and unrealized profits.
c. Total of off-budget and on-budget items.
d. Unrealized profits; total profits not reported as a separate item.
SOURCES: "Income and Expenses of Federal Reserve Banks," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, years 1975-
1989; and "On-budget and Off-budget Receipts by Source," Table FFO-2, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, years 1975—1989-
countries to coordinate their macroeconomic
policy. Coordinated intervention could enhance
the credibility of an announced coordinated
monetary policy, because it might indicate that
other countries found the proposed policy
change appropriate and that they would not
attempt to offset the exchange-rate implications.
Indeed, some empirical results suggest that
coordinated intervention is more effective than
unilateral intervention. Dominguez (1988), for
example, provides evidence in favor of this
case. Moreover, Klein and Rosengren (1991)
find a larger effect from coordinated interven-
tion. Loopesko (1984), despite somewhat less
conclusive results, finds that coordinated West
German intervention had a significantly differ-
ent effect than noncoordinated intervention.
Humpage (1989) and Humpage and Osterberg
(1990), on the other hand, could not attach spe-
cial significance to coordination.
In a similar vein, intervention could provide a
quick, simple, and relatively inexpensive way
for countries to signal to one another their contin-
uing willingness to coordinate macroeconomic
policies. Game theoreticians recognize that
players will often act in a cooperative manner,
even without a formal enforcement mechanism,
if each perceives cooperation to be to his ad-
vantage and if each believes that the others will
not revert to a noncooperative behavior. Formal
enforcement structures do not exist to ensure in-
ternational macroeconomic policy coordination.
One might then view intervention as a signal to
other countries, not of a future policy change,
but of an ongoing commitment to previously
agreed-upon policy changes; that is, a signal that
the intervening country will not revert to non-
cooperative behavior.
The G5 Plaza accord in September 1985, for
example, focused on eliminating current account
imbalances in West Germany, Japan, and the
United States, with the implication that these
countries would undertake appropriate macro-
economic policies. Given the lack of evidence in
support of prolonged sterilized intervention, one
might view the subsequent intervention, at least
in part, as a signal to do just that. By late October
of that year, however, the United States andWest Germany were not reinforcing the G5
agreement with additional policy changes, and
by November, both countries expressed concern
about the underlying implications of the G5 ini-
tiatives for their domestic monetary policies.
Joint intervention ended in early November,
and the United States refrained from intervening
until early 1987. During 1986, despite some joint
changes in discount rates, international policy
was not undertaken cooperatively. As Frankel
(1990, p. 24) notes, "... [James] Baker was re-
peatedly quoted in the press as 'talking the dol-
lar down,' in large part as a weapon to induce
the trading partners to cut interest rates."
Market Inefficiency
Economists characterize exchange markets as in-
formationally efficient, because traders face strong
incentives to consider all available information.
Nevertheless, a sufficient amount of anecdotal
and empirical evidence suggests that exchange
markets are not perfectly efficient. If central
banks enjoy an informational advantage, they
may intervene and improve market efficiency.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that if in-
formation is costly to discover and to transmit,
exchange rates sometimes must reflect informa-
tional inefficiencies. These inefficiencies explain
the sizable expenditures and frequent large prof-
its of leading market participants. Hung (1991a)
contends that many market participants do not
base their trades on generally recognized eco-
nomic determinants of exchange rates. Instead,
so-called noise traders assess recent exchange-
rate trends or "psychological factors," whose
long-term economic significance is not always
obvious. Hung states that because noise traders
use broadly similar techniques and often
respond to the same news, they can sometimes
dominate exchange markets, creating band-
wagon effects and moving the exchange rate
away from levels consistent with economic
fundamentals. Although such activities create
profit opportunities for those who trade on fun-
damentals, Hung notes that, in the short term at
least, the potential rewards might not be great
enough to justify the costs and the risks.
A number of empirical studies also suggest
that information inefficiencies do exist. Loopes-
ko (1984), in an early study of daily intervention,
finds that lagged independent and dependent
variables help to explain day-to-day unexploited
arbitrage profits. This suggests inefficiency in
the processing of information. More recently, in
an important study that questions the rationality
of exchange-market expectations, Frankel and
Froot (1987) find evidence that survey respon-
dents exhibit biased expectations and that
bandwagon effects exist, but are stabilizing. In
an extension of this work that uses more-
detailed survey data, Ito (1990) determines that
individuals and industries hold dissimilar expec-
tations about future exchange-rate movements,
and that industrial groups exhibit "wishful think-
ing" with respect to forecasts. His results ques-
tion the assumption that expectations are
formed rationally and lend further support to
the view that bandwagon effects occur in the
short run. Also analogous in opening a role for
intervention, but not strictly the same, other in-
vestigators note the possible existence of multi-
ple exchange-rate equilibria, of exchange-rate
overshooting, and of bubbles, even allowing for
rational expectations.
The existence of temporary informational
inefficiencies could create an occasion when
central-bank intervention might improve the
functioning of exchange markets, even without
priority information about future monetary poli-
cies. Monetary authorities have long recognized
this possibility. According to the Jurgensen
Report (1983, p. 21), "The authorities in each of
the Summit countries at times undertook large
scale intervention when they judged that market
participants had not taken full account of funda-
mental factors, [or] had only reacted slowly to
changes in fundamentals...." Official exchange
transactions following the G5 meeting at the
Plaza in September 1985 adopted this view; dele-
gates characterized exchange rates as inconsis-
tent with underlying fundamentals.
For intervention to improve exchange mar-
kets by dampening or eliminating near-term
exchange-rate deviations from their equilibrium
paths, central banks must have timely and pre-
cise information about market fundamentals and
their relationship to exchange rates. Otherwise,
the central banks could not determine that
exchange-rate movements represented a devia-
tion from equilibrium rather than an adjustment
to a new equilibrium. As already noted, attempts
to relate market fundamentals to exchange rates
have not been very successful.
Although inefficiencies may exist in the short
run, persistent deviations from equilibrium
eventually will create profit opportunities suffi-
cient enough to offset the risks for those who
trade on fundamentals. Little empirical evidence
exists to suggest that short-term inefficiencies
disrupt trade or investment flows. Many econo-
mists claim to have identified periods (such as
1984) when exchange rates departed fromfundamental levels and disrupted trade, but
such cases are exceptional.
Hung (1991a, 1991b) also notes that to offset
market inefficiencies, central banks must have
timely information about the trading strategies of
noise traders and should conduct their opera-
tions in secrecy. Humpage (1984) suggests that
knowledge of official intervention can have
destabilizing effects if the market interprets inter-
vention purchases of dollars, for example, as evi-
dence that the dollar is fundamentally weak. This
seems possible in the case of noise trading. Hung
theorizes that central banks undertake such inter-
vention in secrecy, because if they convince the
noise traders that private participants are affect-
ing the market trend, then the noise traders
might sustain the exchange-rate movement.
These comments imply that the occasions on
which a central bank might successfully exploit
market inefficiencies are probably rare. They do
not belie the possibility that intervention could
operate through such a channel. Indeed, some
preliminary papers by Dominguez and Frankel
(1989), Dominguez (1990a), and Hung (1991b)
offer tentative support. All of these papers incor-
porate survey data, which have shown infonna-
tional inefficiencies in exchange markets, and
they all find some evidence that intervention can
significantly affect exchange rates.
Dominguez and Frankel estimate a two-
equation simultaneous system that includes a
portfolio-adjustment equation. As noted previ-
ously, they also find a significant influence
through the portfolio channel. In evaluating the
quantitative significance of their results, they sug-
gest that this channel alone might not be impor-
tant, but when combined with an effect on
expectations, the magnitude of the influence
could become decisive.
Hung (1991b) regresses unexpected exchange-
rate changes on numerous "news" variables and
on U.S. intervention cumulated over the survey
horizon. After deriving expected volatility from
currency-option prices, she also regresses unex-
pected changes in exchange-rate volatility on
the news variables and on intervention. Hung's





An appendix to this paper briefly summarizes
recent literature covering G3 intervention. These
studies lend some support to signaling, in the
sense that they all find periodic correlations
among the relevant variables. What they do not
find is a persistent relationship between inter-
vention and exchange rates across time periods.
As Meese (1990) notes, economists have en-
joyed little success in specifying a reliable model
of exchange-rate determination. This limits our
conclusions about the efficacy of intervention,
especially sterilized intervention. In addition, vir-
tually none of the work on intervention derives
from solid structural models, incorporating theo-
retical interactions among intervention, investors'
portfolios, central-bank monetary policies, or
expectations. '^ The results are consistent with
many stories about how intervention works and
how failure to find an influence might reflect an
inadequate specification. The task of evaluating
intervention would be much easier if we had reli-
able guides to the equilibrium path of exchange
rates and to the formulation of expectations.
1
6
The lack of a strong model increases the
danger that any observed relationship between
intervention and exchange rates could depend
on factors not directly measured in the experi-
ment: statements by officials, the degree of
market uncertainty, the state of the economy at
home and abroad, other domestic policies, or
international agreements on policy. This is par-
ticularly true with high-frequency data, since
most economic variables are not measured
more frequently than monthly. Often, these con-
ditions and events in themselves enhance the
credibility of policy announcements or convey
information. If other factors are sometimes cor-
related with intervention, one might easily ob-
serve periodic, short-lived effects on exchange
rates. Our ability to draw inferences about sig-
naling from such correlations is limited.
Nonsterilized
Intervention
Although sterilized intervention could tempo-
rarily affect exchange rates under some rather
unusual circumstances, central banks must link
their exchange-rate objectives with their mone-
tary policies in order to influence rates regularly
and permanently. Most central banks, including
the Federal Reserve System, at times seem to
operate in this fashion, either by not fully steril-
izing their intervention or by occasionally adopt-
ing exchange-rate objectives for their monetary
• 15 See Osterberg (1989) for a model of the risk premium that
specifically introduces intervention.
I 16 This paragraph reflects comments from Bonnie Loopesko.policies. This section considers the possible con-
flicts that nonsterilized intervention can cause.
1
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Marston (1985) provides a comprehensive
review of stabilization policy, indicating how
different assumptions about the formulation of
expectations, allowances for wage indexing,
inclusions of wealth, and the extent of asset sub-
stitutability modify conclusions about exchange-
rate policies drawn from small open-economy
macroeconomic models. Although the qualifica-
tions and permutations are extensive, some gen-
eral conclusions pertain to discussions of the
appropriateness of nonsterilized intervention.
Most notably, Marston's survey shows that
less exchange-rate flexibility promotes overall
price stability only when temporary, domestic
monetary (or financial) shocks predominate. In
this case, using nonsterilized intervention to
smooth exchange rates will not conflict with
price stability, because monetary shocks raise or




When real economic shocks predominate,
however, greater exchange-rate flexibility pro-
motes overall price stability, although the case
seems weaker for supply shocks than for
demand shocks.
1
9 Under such circumstances,
attempting to smooth exchange rates might
actually increase the price movements necessary
to compensate for the shocks, because flexible
rates aid price movements in eliminating excess
supply or demand. Moreover, in responding to
real shocks, intervention might reduce the credi-
bility of a central bank's long-term commitment
to price stability, by demonstrating that central
banks would compromise that objective.
Marston's survey also weakens the argument
that floating exchange rates insulate an economy
from foreign shocks, by showing the large num-
ber of possible ways that exchange-rate changes
might transmit these shocks. Nevertheless, his
survey does not argue that fixed rates and inter-
vention are superior to floating exchange rates
on this score.
Given that no single exchange-rate regime pro-
motes stability in all cases, a hybrid exchange-rate
regime, with the degree of intervention contin-
gent on the predominant nature of shocks,
might seem optimal. Such would indeed be the
• 17 Foran interesting discussion of nonsterilized intervention,
expectations, and target zones, see Klein (1989) and Klein and Lewis
(1991).
• 18 Glick and Hutchison (1990) provide an easy-to-read exposition,
which uses a simple model.
case in a world where the central bank had per-
fect information about the nature of economic
disturbances. Unfortunately, economists dis-
agree on whether monetary or real shocks have
been primarily responsible for the variation in
real and nominal exchange rates since the early
1970s. Even in cases where monetary shocks
predominate, the proper intervention response
is not clear. Central banks should smooth
exchange-rate movements in some cases and
accentuate them in others.
The richness of Marston's survey suggests,
whether intentionally or not, that economists




quently, one cannot reach an unequivocal
conclusion about the benefits of targeting ex-
change rates with monetary policy. At best, the
literature offers a qualified recommendation for
nonsterilized intervention when a domestically
produced disturbance is clearly monetary in na-
ture. Such instances do occur and are some-
times readily discernible. In the 1977-79 period,
for example, the dollar depreciated sharply as
U.S. inflation accelerated relative to inflation
abroad and as markets lost confidence in our
willingness to eliminate it. A monetary contrac-




Economists have offered various theoretical argu-
ments in support of sterilized intervention. Some
researchers have found statistically significant
and, at times, quantitatively important relation-
ships between intervention and exchange rates.
I have argued that this evidence does not en-
dorse an active intervention policy, as the G3
countries have often conducted in recent years.
The empirical evidence generally does not find
an economically significant relationship between
the risk premium and intervention, as required by
the portfolio-adjustment theory. This finding sug-
gests that intervention, at least in volumes typically
observed, cannot permanently alter exchange
rates, independent of monetary policy. Central
banks must weigh exchange-rate objectives in tan-
dem with their inflation objectives.
Similarly, I question the idea that central-
bank intervention provides a credible market
signal of future policy intentions. Central banks
do not generally seem to operate in this man-
ner, and intervention does not have an obvious
19 See Glick and Hutchison (1990). 20 See also Frankel and Rockett (1988).comparative advantage over other methods of
ensuring monetary policy credibility. Most im-
portant, such intervention cannot remain steril-
ized and effective; it does not constitute an
independent policy instrument.
One might interpret the portfolio-adjustment
and the monetary-signal arguments for interven-
tion as requiring much larger magnitudes of
intervention. The United States, for example,
has built up its foreign-exchange reserves since
the early 1980s to approximately $42 billion.
While this might enhance our ability to intervene
through these rather questionable channels, it
also greatly increases our exposure to foreign-
exchange losses.
Intervention, however, might play a role in in-
ternational macroeconomic policy coordination,
serving as a signal of continuing cooperation.
Countries may not even intend such intervention
primarily to influence exchange rates, although
such an effect could be a desired side benefit.
Although I know of no research specifically
directed at this issue, the hypothesis is not incon-
sistent with recent patterns of intervention. It
also may explain the interest in coordinated in-
tervention, which other theories of intervention
do not require, except to reduce the overall costs.
A recent body of literature suggests that
foreign-exchange markets are at times informa-
tionally inefficient and that intervention, by im-
proving market efficiency, could influence
exchange rates. Indeed, some of the most inter-
esting recent empirical support is consistent
with this explanation. Nevertheless, how impor-
tant are these inefficiencies? Do they obviously
disrupt international commerce? Do central
banks regularly meet the informational require-
ments to exploit this situation successfully? At
best, this literature seems to support relatively
small, secretive interventions under conditions
of extreme market disorder.
Although the scope for affecting exchange
rates through sterilized intervention seems nar-
row, nearly all economists recognize that
countries can influence nominal exchange rates
through their monetary policies. The literature
indicates, however, that nonsterilized interven-
tion can conflict with domestic price stability.
Only when domestic monetary shocks create
exchange-market disturbances will intervention
remain consistent with price stability. Although
this observation justifies targeting exchange
rates with monetary policy under certain cir-
cumstances, it does not justify pursuing that
policy through currency purchases in the ex-
change market, rather than through typical
open-market operations. A small country
lacking well-developed secondary markets in
government bonds might find such intervention
useful for conducting its monetary policy. The
Swiss have traditionally conducted monetary
policy through foreign-exchange purchases.
Nevertheless, the benefits to larger countries,
such as West Germany, Japan, and the United




This appendix summarizes recent empirical stud-
ies of U.S., West German, and Japanese interven-
tion. One can interpret the results as broadly
relating to a signaling approach, either because
they incorporate high-frequency data or because
their methodology suggests this approach. Edi-
son (1990) presents a comprehensive survey of
intervention literature, including earlier papers,
research on the portfolio-adjustment mechanism,
and research on intervention profits.
Humpage (1984) investigates dollar-mark
interventions by the United States and other
major developed countries for a one-year period
following President Carter's November 1, 1978,
intervention efforts. Using simultaneous Box-
Jenkins techniques, he finds that both unantici-
pated U.S. intervention against marks and
unanticipated foreign intervention against dollars
were significantly correlated with the closing
exchange rate. The results, however, suggest that
official dollar purchases resulted in a dollar de-
preciation. The coefficients were economically
insignificant. The reaction function suggests that
central banks attempted to smooth exchange-
rate movements, or leaned against the wind.
Loopesko (1984) finds that lagged, cumulative
intervention was related to changes in ex-post
arbitrage profits in 11 out of 24 cases. The stron-
gest evidence is for Canadian dollars, West Ger-
man marks, Japanese yen, and French francs in
sample periods extending from late 1978 through
1981. This supports the portfolio-adjustment
channel. Moreover, lagged exchange rates or
profits were significant in about 21 of the cases,
implying less-than-perfect market efficiency. In
some cases for West Germany (when passive in-
tervention was eliminated from the data), the ef-
fect of coordinated intervention was different
from the effect of uncoordinated intervention.
In a unique and interesting paper, Domin-
guez (1988) studies the ability of intervention to
signal monetary policy intentions between
January 1977 and February 1981. She regressesintervention on unanticipated money, which
she calculates using survey data, and also
regresses exchange-rate changes on interven-
tion. Following the Volcker shift in operating
procedures in October 1979, intervention sig-
naled the Fed's intention to offset unanticipated
fluctuations in money. This intervention bore a
significant and correctly signed relationship to
the exchange rate, suggesting that the market
believed the signal. The results for the Carter-
Miller anti-inflation period, beginning in Novem-
ber 1978, and for the Carter-Volcker credit
control period, beginning in March 1980, do not
support the signaling hypothesis.
Humpage (1989) looks at U.S. intervention,
measured with dummy variables, from August
1984 through August 1987 and finds only three
instances when intervention clearly affected
exchange rates. In all cases, the association was
with the first official transaction after a period of
no intervention and followed an unusual event
or announcement. This intervention also tended
to lean with the wind. The impact seemed short-
lived and not associated with subsequent official
transactions following the initial intervention.
Using actual intervention data instead of dummy
variables over similar time periods, Humpage
(1989) reexamines these findings. The only dif-
ference is that initial intervention sometimes ap-
peared significant even if not associated with an
unusual event or policy announcement. A dis-
tinction between coordinated and unilateral in-
tervention was not important. These coefficient
estimates could contain a simultaneity bias.
Dominguez and Frankel (1989) estimate a
two-equation simultaneous system that con-
siders both signaling and portfolio-adjustment
channels over two subperiods: November 1982
to October 1984 and October 1984 to December
1987. The models use survey data for values of
expected future exchange rates. The portfolio
equation considers intervention both in absolute
terms and relative to wealth. The researchers
either cumulated intervention over the expecta-
tions horizon or from the start of the sample, or
entered the individual intervention prior to the
survey measure. The evidence offers support to
the portfolio channel.
A second equation models expectations as
extrapolations from past exchange-rate changes,
but includes a dummy variable for reported
"news" of any official actions to affect the
exchange rate and a measure of reported inter-
vention (the intervention series times the news
dummy). Both of these intervention variables
often prove significant, but the news dummy
does so more often. The authors' quantitative
analysis of the results suggests that intervention
that has only a portfolio effect is quantitatively
insignificant, but intervention that also alters ex-
pectations can be quantitatively significant.
Dominguez and Frankel focus on U.S. and
West German intervention to affect dollar-mark
exchange rates, because Japanese intervention
data were not available. Dominguez (1990a) ex-
tends this work by including U.S. and Japanese
intervention to affect the dollar-yen exchange
rate from January 1985 to December 1988. The
results were broadly similar.
Dominguez (1990b) investigates intervention
and ex-post arbitrage profits from January 1985
to December 1987. Various subperiods show
different results with respect to the significance
and the sign of the coefficients for unilateral
and coordinated intervention. Overall, how-
ever, coordinated intervention is more apt to
show a significant and correctly signed coeffi-
cient than is unilateral intervention. Sometimes,
notably in the G5 period (September through
December 1985), the coefficient on coordinated
intervention appears to exert an economically
significant effect.
Although these conclusions hold for over-
night transactions, they appear more often over
one-month and three-month investment
horizons. When the results hold only for the
longer horizons, intervention dollar sales (pur-
chases) must raise (lower) domestic interest
rates, lower (raise) foreign interest rates, or ap-
preciate (depreciate) the future exchange rate,
but do not affect the spot exchange rate.
Humpage and Osterberg (1990), using a
generalized autoregressive conditional hetero-
scedasticity (GARCH) model, examine the ef-
fects of daily U.S., West German, and Japanese
intervention on ex-post arbitrage profits from
January 3, 1983, to February 19, 1990. Follow-
ing Loopesko (1984), they find cumulative inter-
vention associated with a very small, significant
increase in the mark-dollar risk premium, but
find cumulative intervention in the yen-dollar
market to be insignificant. The variance equa-
tion does not include cumulative intervention.
Following Dominguez (1988), they differentiate
between coordinated and unilateral interven-
tion, and do not cumulate the data. Coordinated
intervention was not significant in any mean or
variance equations, nor was unilateral West Ger-
man intervention. Unilateral Japanese interven-
tion was significant in the mean with the wrong
sign, and in the variance with a positive coeffi-
cient. Unilateral U.S. intervention was not sig-
nificant in the mark-dollar equations, but wassignificant in the yen-dollar, conditional-
variance equation with a negative coefficient.
Building on theoretical arguments for inter-
vention when noise trading persists, Hung
(1991b) investigates the impact of U.S. interven-
tion on both the level and volatility of exchange
rates. She regresses unexpected exchange-rate
changes on net intervention cumulative up to
the realization of the expectation, and on four
common news variables: unanticipated trade
deficits, unemployment results, producer-price
inflation, and changes in interest-rate differen-
tials. Hung measures volatility by the standard
deviation of exchange rates over two-week in-
tervals and regresses unexpected exchange-rate
volatility on the news variables and on cumula-
tive gross intervention. (Hung estimates ex-
pected exchange-rate volatility from option
prices.) The tests span two subperiods: Decem-
ber 1984 to December 1986, and January 1987
to December 1989- The results are mixed. U.S.
intervention affects the yen exchange rate in
both subperiods and influences the mark in the
second period. U.S. intervention lowers
exchange-rate volatility in the first period, but
otherwise raises volatility. Hung interprets the
disparate results as indicating that the effective-
ness of intervention depends on market condi-
tions and on the skill of those intervening.
Klein and Rosengren (1991) consider inter-
vention from the September 1985 Plaza agree-
ment to the October 1979 stock-market crash,
proxying official transactions with dummies
based on newspaper accounts. Interventions
did not precede monetary policy changes with
sufficient frequency to suggest that the United
States or West Germany intended them as a sig-
nal of future monetary policy changes. Never-
theless, coordinated intervention did have a
statistically significant and correctly signed im-
pact on daily exchange-rate changes between
the Plaza and Tokyo (May 1986) summits. Uni-
lateral U.S. intervention influenced the exchange
rate between the Tokyo and Louvre summits.
Klein and Rosengren conclude that the market
initially thought of intervention as a policy sig-
nal, but soon learned that central banks were
not using it as such.
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